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Bilingualism is commonly assumed to improve creativity but the mechanisms underlying
creative acts, and the way these mechanisms are affected by bilingualism, are not very
well understood.We hypothesize that learning to master multiple languages drives individ-
uals toward a relatively focused cognitive-control state that exerts strong top-down impact
on information processing and creates strong local competition for selection between
cognitive codes. Considering the control requirements posed by creativity tasks tapping
into convergent and divergent thinking, this predicts that high-proﬁcient bilinguals should
outperform low-proﬁcient bilinguals in convergent thinking, while low-proﬁcient bilinguals
might be better in divergent thinking. Comparing low- and high-proﬁcient bilinguals on
convergent-thinking and divergent-thinking tasks indeed showed a high-proﬁcient bilingual
advantage for convergent thinking but a low-proﬁcient bilingual advantage for ﬂuency in
divergent thinking. These ﬁndings suggest that bilingualism should not be related to “cre-
ativity” as a unitary concept but, rather, to the speciﬁc processes and mechanisms that
underlie creativity.
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INTRODUCTION
Increasing evidence suggests that speaking more than one lan-
guage does not only improve one’s verbal skills but also more
general, non-linguistic cognitive abilities. For instance, bilingual
individuals have been demonstrated to outperform monolinguals
in problem solving (Bain, 1975), perceptual focusing (Duncan and
De Avila, 1979), and the Simon task (e.g., Bialystok et al., 2004; for
a general review, see Bialystok and Craik, 2010). According to a
growing consensus, the bilingual beneﬁt is related to executive con-
trol functions, which are assumed to improve by learning multiple
languages. To account for the bilingual beneﬁt, some of the ear-
lier approaches have considered that dealing with a new language
might require the suppression of the dominant language, which
might imply improvements in inhibitory control (Green, 1998;
Bialystok, 2001). Other approaches have argued that preventing
conﬂict between languages does not necessarily require direct
inhibition but the combination of attentional top-down biasing
together with local competition (i.e., direct interactions between
alternative cognitive codes) may do (Poulisse and Bongaerts, 1994;
Dijkstra and van Heuven, 1998; La Heij, 2005; Bialystok et al.,
2006). This latter approach has received support from the obser-
vation that bilinguals are no more efﬁcient in inhibiting unwanted
responses than monolinguals but are less efﬁcient than mono-
linguals in distributing attentional resources over multiple visual
target events (Colzato et al., 2008). This suggests that learning
multiple languages does not improve inhibitory skills but, rather,
leads to a stronger, more selective focusing of cognitive control
(Colzato et al., 2008).
The aim of the present study was to further characterize this
focusing of control by investigating the impact of bilingualism
on different types of creativity. Authors have argued at length
about how the concept of creativity should be deﬁned, whether
creativity research should focus on the creative individual, the
creative act, or the cognitive processes leading to it, and there is
accordingly no consensus as to how creativity should be mea-
sured (for an overview, see Runco, 2007). Massive research from
the last 40 years or so provides strong evidence that bilingualism
somehow supports creativity, and a recent report of the European
commission has listed more than 200 articles demonstrating this
connection (European Commission, 2009). Unfortunately, how-
ever, the methodological diversity and sample characteristics of
these studies are enormous, which renders it more than question-
able whether they were actually assessing the same construct and
processes. Moreover, there is still no mechanistic model explaining
how creative processes operate and how bilingualism might affect
these operations, which in view of the lack of conceptual clarity
may not be surprising.
To address this issue, we tried to avoid addressing creativ-
ity as a whole. Instead, we compared high-proﬁcient bilinguals
with low-proﬁcient bilinguals in two tasks that are likely to repre-
sent relatively process-pure measures of components of creativity:
divergent thinking and convergent thinking. We do not claim that
these are the only processes involved in creative acts (even though
Guilford, 1967, considers them the by far most important) nor
that individuals showing good performance with regard to these
components need to be considered creative in general. Rather, we
considered these two components and the two related assessments
tasks as – in contrast to other components and tasks, and to creativ-
ity as a whole – the cognitive-control operations they are likely to
rely on are relatively well understood (Hommel et al., manuscript
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submitted). Moreover, the fact that they are uncorrelated (Akbari
Chermahini and Hommel, 2010) suggests that they are measuring
different components of creativity indeed.
Divergent thinking can be deﬁned as the process that allows
people to generate asmany responses as possible basedon relatively
weak constraints.As an example, inGuilford’s (1967) alternateuses
task (AUT) people are presented with a simple object, such as a
pen, and asked to generate as many uses for that object they can
think of. The results are commonly scored regarding the number
of responses (ﬂuency), the number of different categories being
used (ﬂexibility), the degree to which the responses differ from the
standard or group mean (originality), and the amount of detail
(elaboration). In contrast, convergent thinking can be deﬁned as
a more strongly constrained process that searches for one possi-
ble outcome.As an example, inMednick’s (1962) remote associates
task (RAT) people are presentedwith three concepts, such as“hair,”
“stretch” and “time,” and they are to identify the one concept that
ﬁts with all three in terms of association, meaning, or abstraction,
such as “long” in the example.
Even though one can argue that both types of processes and
tasks share a number of aspects, they are likely to require, or at
least beneﬁt from two different conﬁgurations of cognitive con-
trol. In its most elementary form, any type of biologically plausible
decision-making can be considered a competition between alter-
native codes or representations (Bogacz, 2007) – such as between
representations of the English word “frog” and the semantically
equivalent Dutch word “kikker” in a picture-naming English–
Dutch bilingual, between representations of the alternative uses of
a “pen” in the AUT, or between representations of close associates
of the three deﬁning words in a trial of the RAT. This kind of “local
competition,” as we will call it, is likely to generate random results
unless it is steered by the current task goal. Duncan et al. (1996)
have suggested that the impact of task goals on behavioral control
might consist in providing top-down support for those represen-
tations that are most consistent with the current goal, so that the
competition between cognitive representations can be considered
a top-down “biased competition.” As suggested by Colzato et al.
(2008), people might differ with respect to the degree to which
they experience local competition and/or the degree to which they
bias this competition by top-down processes. Consider what pos-
sible differences regarding cognitive-control states (strong versus
weak top-down bias and/or local competition) imply for different
types of creativity tasks.
Divergent thinking (as assessed by the AUT) is likely to ben-
eﬁt from a cognitive-control state that provides a minimum of
top-down bias and local competition, so that the individual can
easily and quickly “jump” from one thought to the other in an
only weakly guided fashion (Hommel et al., manuscript submit-
ted). In contrast, convergent thinking (as assessed by the RAT)
is likely to beneﬁt from strong top-down bias (that is repre-
senting the greater number of constraints that possible solutions
need to meet) and strong local competition (as only one solu-
tion can be right). If so, engaging in divergent thinking should
facilitate subsequent performance in tasks that require weak, “dis-
tributed”control while engaging in convergent thinking should be
beneﬁcial for subsequent performance in tasks requiring a more
focused, exclusive control style, that is, strong top-down control
and local competition. Indeed, previous divergent thinking was
found to improve performance in tasks that require the distri-
bution of attention to two successive visual targets (Hommel et
al., manuscript submitted) and increased inter-task interactions
between two overlapping tasks (Fischer and Hommel, submit-
ted), while previous convergent-thinking improved performance
in selective-attention and response-competition tasks (Hommel
et al., manuscript submitted).
Relating the ﬁndings from research on bilinguals to the obser-
vations from creativity studies suggests that the cognitive-control
style that seems to be acquired by learning multiple languages
ﬁts well with the style implied by convergent thinking. If so, a
straightforward hypothesis presents itself: high-proﬁcient bilin-
guals should outperform low-proﬁcient bilinguals in convergent
thinking while the opposite should be the case with divergent
thinking. At ﬁrst sight, this hypothesis seems to be disproved by
the available evidence. Numerous studies have claimed that bilin-
gualism has a speciﬁc, positive effect on divergent thinking (for an
overview, see Ricciardelli, 1992). However, previous studies have
a number of characteristics that make it difﬁcult to relate them
to our hypothesis, such as reporting only aggregated total scores
of creativity (across often heterogeneous scales) and the use of
tasks that are unlikely to provide sufﬁciently process-pure mea-
surements of convergent versus divergent thinking. For instance,
the recent studies of Kharkhurin (2009, 2010) employed the abbre-
viated torrance test for adults (ATTA, Goff and Torrance, 2002) to
assess divergent thinking. The test consisted of three activities:
identifying the troubles that one may encounter when walking on
air, completing incomplete pictures, and drawing as many pictures
as possible based on a given group of triangles. Even though all
these activities certainly require some form of creativity, they all
seem to be much more balanced with respect to the generation
aspect (that would beneﬁt from weak top-down control and local
competition) and the number of constraints (which call for strong
top-down control and local competition) than theAUT (which has
fewer constraints) on the one hand and the RAT (which allows for
one result only) on the other. Hence, the ATTA arguably mixes
divergent and convergent operations more than necessary, which
makes it difﬁcult to make predictions from a control-state point of
view. Moreover, Ricciardelli (1992) already identiﬁed a number of
studies that did not show the expected divergent-thinking beneﬁts
inbilinguals or even an advantage formonolinguals.More recently,
two other studies reported better performance in monolinguals
than bilinguals in a verbal ﬂuency task (requiring to generate as
many exemplars of a given category as possible) that bears some
similarities to the divergent-thinking AUT (Rosselli et al., 2000;
Gollan et al., 2002). Hence, a closer look reveals that the evidence
for better divergent thinking in bilinguals is rather mixed (we con-
sider some possible reasons in the Discussion), which is why we
considered it still reasonable to compare high-proﬁcient with low-
proﬁcient bilinguals in divergent thinking (assessed by means of
the AUT) and convergent thinking (assessed by means of the RAT)
separately.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Forty-two young healthy adults served as participants for partial
fulﬁllment of course credit or a ﬁnancial reward and consti-
tuted the two language groups: low-proﬁcient and high-proﬁcient
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Table 1 | Demographic data measures, vocabulary proficiency scores,
originality, fluency, flexibility, and elaboration scores from the
alternate uses task (AUT), the number of correct items from the
remote associates task (RAT), means, and SD for the low-proficient
and high-proficient bilinguals are shown.
Sample Low-proficient High-proficient
N (F:M) 12:9 12:9
Age (in years) 19.6 (3.2) 20.7 (1.1)
IQ 121.8 (4.1) 123.7 (6.0)
English vocabulary score* 3754 (748) 4164 (520)
AUT
Elaboration 4.2 (3.1) 3.3 (2.3)
Fluency* 40.7 (11.6) 32.5 (11.1)
Flexibility 27.2 (7.5) 26.4 (8.3)
Originality 17.4 (16.1) 12.8 (6.7)
RAT* 13.3 (3.1) 15.8 (4.2)
*p<0.05 (signiﬁcant group difference).
bilinguals. All reported having normal or corrected-to-normal
vision, and were not familiar with the purpose of the experiment.
Half of the participants were low-proﬁcient bilingual German
native-speaker students of the Technische Universität Dresden
(Germany),and theother half wereDutch–Englishhigh-proﬁcient
bilinguals living in the Netherlands. All participants were tested by
the same instructional protocols, although the actual testing was
carried out in two different countries. The high-proﬁcient bilin-
gual participants attended the high school in English and some of
them had lived part of their life in an English-speaking country.
They used both Dutch and English on a daily basis throughout
their lives. As research with bilingual adults (Kroll and Stewart,
1994) and children (Bialystok, 1988) has revealed that the cogni-
tive and linguistic consequences of bilingualism are more salient
for those bilinguals who are relatively balanced in their proﬁciency,
we only considered balanced bilinguals for the present study. The
low-proﬁcient bilingual German participants were not function-
ally ﬂuent in any other language despite the inevitable language
courses in school. All participants in both groups attended univer-
sity and shared similar middle-class socioeconomic backgrounds,
and they were matched for age, sex, and IQ (measured by Raven’s
standard progressivematrices, SPM), see Table 1. Participants gave
their written informed consent prior to their inclusion in the study
in accordance to the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki.
PROCEDURE AND DESIGN
The experiment consisted of a 45-min session in which partici-
pants completed the AUT to assess divergent thinking, the RAT
to assess convergent thinking, a vocabulary test to access partici-
pants’ proﬁciency in English, and a short-version of a reasoning-
based intelligence test (Raven’s SPM; Raven et al., 1988). After
completion of the tasks, the participants were debriefed and paid.
AUT (divergent thinking)
In this task (based on Guilford, 1967, and translated into Dutch
and German), participants were asked to list as many possible uses
for three common household items (brick, shoe, and newspaper)
as they can within 10min. Scoring comprised of four components:
Originality: Each response is compared to the total amount of
responses from all of the subjects. Responses that were given by
only 5% of the group count as unusual (1 point) and responses
given by only 1% of them count as unique (2 points).
Fluency: The total of all responses.
Flexibility: The number of different categories used.
Elaboration: The amount of detail (e.g., “a doorstop” counts 0,
whereas “a door stop to prevent a door slamming shut in a strong
wind” counts 2 (1 point for explanation of door slamming and
another for further detail about the wind).
RAT (convergent thinking)
In this task (based on Mednick, 1962, and translated into Dutch
and German), participants were presented with three unrelated
words (such as time, hair, and stretch) and asked to ﬁnd a com-
mon associate (long). Our version comprised of 30 items, which
were to be worked through within 10min.
English vocabulary test
Participants’ proﬁciency in English was assessed with a vocabulary
test consisting of a non-speeded lexical decision task (Christoffels
et al., 2006, manuscript submitted). The test consisted of words
selected from ﬁve different word frequency bins and non-words.
Participants were required to indicate whether or not they knew
the meaning of the English letter strings. The score of the test
ranges from 0 to 5,000 and is corrected for misattribution of
non-words.
SPM (intelligence test)
The SPM assesses the individual’s ability to create perceptual rela-
tions and to reasonby analogy independent of language and formal
schooling; it is a standard, widely used test to measure Spearman’s
g factor and of ﬂuid intelligence in particular.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
Independent t -testswere performed to test differences between the
two groups. From the two tasks, ﬁve measures were extracted for
each participant: originality, ﬂuency, ﬂexibility, and elaboration
scores from the AUT, the number of correct items from the RAT.
Themeasureswere scoredby two independent readers (Cronbach’s
alpha= 0.90). A signiﬁcance level of p< 0.05 was adopted for all
tests.
RESULTS
No signiﬁcant group differences were obtained for age,
t (40)= 1.47, p= 0.15, and intelligence, t (40)= 1.17, p= 0.25. As
expected, high-proﬁcient bilinguals were signiﬁcantly more proﬁ-
cient in the English vocabulary test than low-proﬁcient bilinguals,
t (40)= 2.06, p< 0.05, see Table 1.
Performance in the RAT and AUT was good and compara-
ble to performance in other studies (e.g., Akbari Chermahini and
Hommel, 2010). As expected, high-proﬁcient bilinguals showed
better performance in the RAT task than low-proﬁcient bilinguals,
t (40)= 2.22, p< 0.05. Also as expected, all four scores of the AUT
showed an advantage for low-proﬁcient over high-proﬁcient bilin-
guals. While this advantage did not reach signiﬁcance for ﬂexibil-
ity, t (40)< 1, originality, t (40)= 1.19, p= 0.24, and elaboration,
t (40)= 1.10, p= 0.28, it was reliable for ﬂuency, t (40)= 2.31,
p< 0.05, see Table 1.
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DISCUSSION
The guiding hypothesis of this study assumes that speaking mul-
tiple languages leads to the adoption of a relatively focused
cognitive-control state, at least as a default, which is characterized
by a strong top-downbiasing of informationprocessing and strong
local competition for selection between cognitive codes. Consid-
ering that this control-state ﬁts with the control requirements of
convergent thinking but not of divergent thinking, we predicted
that high-proﬁcient bilinguals should outperform low-proﬁcient
bilinguals in convergent thinking, whereas low-proﬁcient bilin-
guals should perform better in divergent thinking. And this is
exactly what the data show: high-proﬁcient bilinguals excel in con-
vergent thinking while low-proﬁcient bilinguals excel in divergent
thinking, at least with regard to the ﬂuency score.
On the one hand, this outcome is consistent with previous
observations that monolinguals outperform bilinguals in verbal
ﬂuency tasks (Rosselli et al., 2000;Gollan et al., 2002). On the other
hand, however, it does not seem to ﬁt with the general expecta-
tion that bilingualism is associatedwith greater cognitive ﬂexibility
and numerous studies that seem to support this expectation (cf.,
Ricciardelli, 1992; European Commission, 2009). One possible
interpretation, which has been suggested by Kharkhurin (2010),
is that verbal and non-verbal creativity tasks assess different skills
and might be differently affected by bilingualism. Kharkhurin’s
speciﬁc suggestion is that bilinguals might excel in the non-verbal
domain but be outperformed bymonolinguals if it comes to verbal
domains. However, not only is this suggestion difﬁcult to combine
with the fact that bilinguals must master language-related skills
that monolinguals do not need to master, which again implies that
bilinguals do have some unique expertise that relates to the verbal
domain. It is also refuted by our ﬁndings. Both of our thinking
tasks were clearly verbal and drawing on verbal skills, so that the
better performance of bilinguals in the convergent-thinking task
does not ﬁt with the claim that bilinguals’ performance is neces-
sarily inferior to that of monolinguals. But, on the other hand, it
is true that we demonstrated the predicted double dissociation for
the verbal domain only, and it may very well be that non-verbal
tasks show a different pattern.
Another aspect that might explain at least some inconsistencies
in the ﬁeld in general and with regard to the present ﬁndings in
particular relates to the age of the investigated participants. The
majority of studies on the relationship between bilingualism and
creativity have focused on children (Kharkhurin, 2010). In line
with earlier speculations (e.g., Eysenck, 1993; Ashby et al., 1999),
there is increasing evidence for a reliable connection between
dopamine and creativity performance, which for instance has
been shown to vary with the individual density of dopamine
receptors (de Manzano et al., 2010), genetic variability associ-
ated with striatal dopamine production (Reuter et al., 2006), and
the Parkinson-related loss of dopaminergic neurons in the stri-
atal pathway (Batir et al., 2009). Using the same tasks used in the
present study, it could be demonstrated in healthy subjects that
convergent and divergent thinking are mediated by both the indi-
vidual tonic dopamine level (Akbari Chermahini and Hommel,
2010) and phasic changes of this level (Akbari Chermahini and
Hommel, submitted). Interestingly, the brain systems that are tar-
geted by the two major dopaminergic pathways in humans (the
frontal and the striatal pathway; see Cools, 2008) are particularly
strongly affected by developmental factors and are suspected to
keep developing into early adulthood (Gogtay et al., 2004). This ﬁts
with observations of considerable variability of individual creativ-
ity measures over the lifespan (e.g., Simonton, 1997; Wohl, 2003).
Hence, it remains to be seen whether observations from children
really generalize to adults, and whether individual differences in
creativity tasks are stable over time.
Finally, we would like to emphasize that we do not consider our
measures of performance in divergent and convergent-thinking
tasks to represent creativity as a whole – be it as a state or a
personal trait. Divergent and convergent thinking are likely to
be very important, if not crucial (Guilford, 1967), for many cre-
ative acts, but such acts can be suspected to comprise of a whole
sequence of processes and components. Many authors since Wal-
las (1926) have assumed that creative acts run through at least
four stages including preparation, which involves investigating the
problem; incubation, which involves (often unconscious) think-
ing about the problem; illumination, where ideas come together
to form a possible solution; and veriﬁcation, which involves eval-
uating the chosen option. It makes sense to characterize the ﬁrst
two stages as emphasizing divergent processes and the ﬁnal two
stages as emphasizing convergent processes (Hommel, in press),
and it may very well be that individual performance therein can
be predicted to some degree based on the measures used in the
present study. Nevertheless, the complexity of the respective stages
strongly suggests that a number of other cognitive operations
are involved. Accordingly, it would be far-fetched to consider
good performance in the AUT and the RAT sufﬁcient to cate-
gorize individuals as “creative.” Indeed, we sincerely believe that
unpacking complex concepts like “creativity” into their compo-
nent processes represents a crucial step in constructing mechanis-
tic models that are sufﬁciently transparent to undergo rigorous
empirical testing.
And the same goes for the cognitive beneﬁts that come along
with bilingualism: modeling them in detail will also require the
unpacking into component processes. Thepresent ﬁndings suggest
that one of these component processes is responsible for the regu-
lation of cognitive-control states. If we assume that one dimension
on which these states vary relates to the degree of top-down bias-
ing of information processing and of local competition between
alternative cognitive codes (Colzato et al., 2008; Hommel et al.,
manuscript submitted), having learned to handle multiple tasks
seems to drive individuals toward the pole of the dimension that
representsmore biasing andmore competition.Accordingly, bilin-
guals are likely to show particularly good performance on tasks
that are relying or beneﬁting from this control state but to show
relatively poor performance on tasks that require or beneﬁt from
weaker top-down control and less local competition. Examples for
the former are tasks inducing response conﬂict (Bialystok et al.,
2004) and convergent thinking, while examples for the latter are
tasks that call for the distribution of attention (Colzato et al., 2008)
and divergent thinking.
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